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On the early afternoon of 10 May 1996, the weather on Everest still looked fine. Climbers were standing on the summit, taking photos and catching their breath. By midnight, a group of exhausted people was huddled on the South Col in a blizzard, a few hundred meters from their tents and unable to find them.
Eight climbers died over those two days. The story has been told in bestselling books, a documentary and a Hollywood film, and the survivors still disagree about parts of it.
This guide tells it in order: how Everest got so crowded, who was on the slope, what happened hour by hour, and why the accounts differ. You'll also learn about the memorials that keep the memory of those lost alive along the trail to Everest Base Camp.
A Mountain That Got Crowded Fast

For most of the twentieth century, Everest belonged to a handful of national expeditions. Permits were scarce, and the people who went had usually spent years working up to it.
That began to change in the late 1980s, when more permits were issued, and by 1993 a record 129 climbers reached the summit in a single year.
Then came the commercial guides. A few entrepreneurial mountaineers saw an opportunity: organise the ropes, oxygen, Sherpa support and logistics, and people with enough money, fitness and climbing experience could pay for a guided attempt on Everest.
Rob Hall and Gary Ball helped pioneer this approach when they founded Hall and Ball Adventure Consultants in 1991.
By 1996, two names stood out. Rob Hall, a New Zealander known for his careful planning and organised expeditions, led Adventure Consultants.
Scott Fischer, an American mountaineer known for his strength, charisma and adventurous spirit, ran Mountain Madness, a guiding company he had founded in 1984. Their companies were competing for clients, and both led commercial expeditions to Everest that spring.
Both teams also had a writer in the line. Jon Krakauer, on assignment for Outside magazine, climbed with Hall. Sandy Hill Pittman, a climber and journalist, climbed with Fischer.
Krakauer had actually been slotted into Fischer's team first, until Hall, who'd struck a publicity deal with the magazine, cut its fee below cost to land him. Keep that in mind.
When the world is watching and clients have spent years getting to this one weather window, turning around gets a lot harder.
Who Was on the Slope

On 10 May, about 33 climbers left Camp IV on the South Col for the summit. It was the biggest single-day push Everest had seen up to that point.
Adventure Consultants was Hall's team: 19 people, eight of them paying clients. His guides were Mike Groom and Andy Harris, and his head Sherpa was Ang Dorje. The clients included Jon Krakauer, Beck Weathers, Doug Hansen, who had tried Everest with Hall in 1995 and come back for another go, and Yasuko Namba, a Japanese climber who had already stood on six of the Seven Summits. Apart from Namba, none of Hall's clients had ever reached the top of an 8,000-meter peak.
Mountain Madness was Fischer's: also 19 people, also eight clients. His guides were Neal Beidleman and Anatoli Boukreev, a Kazakh-Russian climber so strong that he normally climbed without bottled oxygen, even while guiding. Lopsang Jangbu Sherpa, just 23, was the head Sherpa. The clients included Sandy Hill Pittman, Charlotte Fox, Lene Gammelgaard and Tim Madsen.
A Taiwanese team led by Makalu Gau shared the route. They had already lost one member the day before, when Chen Yu-Nan fell on the Lhotse Face. Other groups were scattered around the mountain too, including a South African team on the South Col and an IMAX film crew.
And over on the Tibetan side, three climbers from an Indo-Tibetan Border Police expedition were making their own summit push along the Northeast Ridge.
They are part of the same story, and they are the part most retellings leave out.
10 May: hour-by-hour Summit Attempts Begin

The plan looked simple on paper. Leave around midnight, reach the summit by about noon, and be back at Camp IV by six in the evening. Hall had set one rule he called "absolute law, beyond appeal": if you haven't reached the top by 2 pm, you turn around, wherever you are. Each climber carried enough oxygen for a round trip of roughly 18 hours.
Here's how the day slipped away from that plan.
Just after midnight, Camp IV (7,900 m). A long line of headlamps climbs out of the South Col into the dark.
Dawn, the Balcony (8,350 m). The first snag. The fixed ropes that were supposed to be waiting haven't been placed, so climbers stand in the cold while guides and Sherpas fix them. It costs almost an hour, burning oxygen and daylight while nobody gains height.
Late morning, the Hillary Step (8,760 m). The same problem, with a bigger crowd. About 33 people are on the route, and Hall and Fischer have asked their clients to stay close together, so everyone funnels toward a single rope. Another hour is lost. This is where Stuart Hutchison, Lou Kasischke and John Taske look at their oxygen gauges and turn back. All three survive.
1:07 pm, the summit. Boukreev gets there first, without bottled oxygen. He stays for about an hour and a half, helping others in, before heading down at 2:30.
2:00 pm. The deadline passes. Hall and Fischer are not on the summit yet, and several clients are still climbing. Nobody turns them around. It's very hard to tell someone who has trained for years and paid a small fortune that the top is close, but they have to go back.
Around 3:00 pm. Snow begins to fall and the light starts to fade. Ang Dorje meets Doug Hansen above the Hillary Step and tells him to head down. Hansen shakes his head and points up. When Hall arrives, the Sherpas offer to take Hansen to the summit. Hall sends them down to help the other clients and to stash oxygen along the route. He will stay with Hansen, who is out of oxygen.
3:45 pm. Fischer finally reaches the summit. He is exhausted and getting sicker, possibly with altitude edema in his lungs, his brain, or both. Hansen and Makalu Gau arrive later still.
5:00 pm onward. Boukreev is already back at Camp IV. At about 5:30, Harris sets off alone from the South Summit, carrying oxygen and water for Hall and Hansen. By now it is a full blizzard. Krakauer would later describe gusts of around 130 km/h stinging his face with snow pellets.
Up to this point, everything that went wrong was a delay. In the next few hours, the delays turn into a rescue operation.
The Night on The South Col

By early evening it is dark, and the storm has erased the route. The fixed ropes are buried, the trail the climbers broke on the way up has vanished, and visibility is a few meters. The South Col is a broad, flat saddle, which turns out to be the problem: there is nothing to steer by.
Nine climbers, including guides Neal Beidleman and Mike Groom, descend together and lose their way. They wander until they can no longer walk, then huddle in the snow about 20 metres from the edge of the Kangshung Face, a sheer drop. Back in camp, Stuart Hutchison tries to organise a rescue and can't find anyone willing to leave the tents. Everyone is spent, and heading out looks like suicide.
Higher up, Fischer is stuck near the Balcony with Makalu Gau, after telling Lopsang to go down without him. Hall is with Hansen above the Hillary Step. Harris is somewhere in between.
Near midnight, the wind eases just long enough for the huddled group to spot Camp IV, roughly 400 metres away. Beidleman, Groom, Klev Schoening and Lene Gammelgaard stagger in to raise the alarm. Charlotte Fox and Tim Madsen stay behind, shouting into the dark so rescuers can find them.
What happens next is the best-established part of the whole story. Anatoli Boukreev, who had summited without oxygen and come down hours earlier, goes back out alone.
He goes three times. On the second and third, he finds the group and brings Sandy Hill Pittman, Charlotte Fox and Tim Madsen back to the tents. He also sees Yasuko Namba, who looks close to death, while Beck Weathers has already wandered off into the storm. Boukreev is too exhausted to go out again before dawn.
The American Alpine Club later gave him its David A. Sowles Memorial Award, its highest honour for valor, for that night.
11 and 12 May: The Morning After

At 4:43 am on 11 May, Hall's voice comes over the radio. He is alive on the South Summit. Hansen, he says, is gone, and Harris is missing. His oxygen regulator has clogged with ice, so he has been breathing the thin air unaided.
By 9 am he has cleared it, but frostbitten hands and feet make the fixed ropes almost impossible to manage.
Late that afternoon, he asks base camp to patch him through to his wife, Jan Arnold, who is pregnant and at home in New Zealand. They talk, and they settle on a name for their unborn child. He tells her he is reasonably comfortable and asks her not to worry too much. It is the last anyone hears from him, and he dies soon afterward.
On 23 May, Ed Viesturs and the IMAX film team find his body. Jan asked that he be left where he was, and he remains on the mountain. The bodies of Hansen and Harris were never found.
Elsewhere on the 11th, Sherpas reach Fischer and Gau. Fischer is too far gone to move. They make him as comfortable as they can and bring Gau down alive. Boukreev climbs up later and finds Fischer's frozen body around 7 pm.
Then there is Beck Weathers. He spent the first night out on the col, left for dead. On the afternoon of the 11th, he regains consciousness, stands up and walks into Camp IV on his own, with severe hypothermia and frostbite. Everyone in camp is stunned.
The next morning, a storm collapses his tent and the others assume he has died, until Krakauer realises he is still conscious. Over the following two days, climbers from several expeditions help him down to Camp II, and he is flown out by helicopter in one of the highest rescues attempted at the time. Gau is evacuated the same way. Weathers lives, though he loses his nose, his right hand, part of that forearm and the fingers of his left hand.
Who Died in the 1996 Mount Everest Disaster?
Eight people died in the storm on 10 and 11 May. Five were on the Nepal side, and three were on the Tibet side.
Name | Role | Team | Where |
|---|---|---|---|
Rob Hall (New Zealand) | Expedition leader | Adventure Consultants | Near the South Summit |
Andy Harris (New Zealand) | Guide | Adventure Consultants | Near the South Summit: body never found |
Doug Hansen (USA) | Client | Adventure Consultants | Near the South Summit: body never found |
Yasuko Namba (Japan) | Client | Adventure Consultants | South Col, close to Camp IV |
Scott Fischer (USA) | Expedition leader | Mountain Madness | Southeast Ridge: near the Balcony |
Tsewang Samanla (India) | Subedar | Indo-Tibetan Border Police | Northeast Ridge, Tibet side |
Dorje Morup (India) | Lance Naik | Indo-Tibetan Border Police | Northeast Ridge, Tibet side |
Tsewang Paljor (India) | Head Constable | Indo-Tibetan Border Police | Northeast Ridge, Tibet side |
The three Indian police officers are often missing from accounts written from the Nepal side, which is why some sources say five died.
You may also see 12 or 15 quoted. Both are real numbers, and they count different things:
12 is the whole spring season. On top of the eight, it includes Chen Yu-Nan (a fall on 9 May), Reinhard Wlasich (altitude sickness, 19 May), Bruce Herrod (died descending after a late summit, 25 May) and Ngawang Topche Sherpa, a Mountain Madness Sherpa who developed pulmonary edema in April and died in a Kathmandu hospital in June.
15 adds an avalanche on 25 September that killed three more, including Lopsang Jangbu Sherpa. Lopsang survived the May storm, which is why he sometimes gets listed among its dead by mistake.
Why it Happened

You've seen the delays and the storm in the story above. What's worth adding is how they fed on each other, and where the popular version of the story is shakier than it looks.
The oxygen budget had no slack. Each client was allotted three bottles, planned around an 18-hour round trip. A bottle lasts about six hours at a moderate flow, so the plan ran out almost exactly when the schedule did. Boukreev was the only one who made it back within 18 hours, and most others ran short on the way down. Up there, the air holds roughly a third of the oxygen found at sea level, so running dry isn't an inconvenience. It slows your thinking, your legs and your hands.
The 2 pm rule was only as strong as the people enforcing it. Hall's deadline was clear, but by 2 pm neither he nor Fischer was on the summit, and Fischer doesn't seem to have set a firm turnaround time at all. Guides will tell you that a client who can see the top is very hard to talk out of it.
The storm may not have been a surprise. Graham Ratcliffe, who was on the South Col that day, later argued in A Day to Die For that forecasts of a major storm building after 8 May and peaking on 11 May had reached both Hall and Fischer before the climb.
Some climbers reached the summit during what looked like a break in that system, just before it returned in full. That makes the "freak storm out of nowhere" version much harder to hold onto.
And when it came, it hit harder than the thermometer suggests. Near the summit, temperatures were around -30 °C with winds above 70 km/h, which puts the wind chill below -50 °C. Researchers at the University of Toronto later calculated that the storm's low pressure cut oxygen uptake for climbers by roughly another 14%.
Pressure, business and media. Some writers, including Ratcliffe, argue that the rivalry between Hall and Fischer and the journalists on their teams added pressure to get clients to the top. Others think that blames commercialisation for too much. Both views are in the record, and nobody can say for certain how much weight they carried.
Communication kept failing. Fischer's head Sherpa had no company radio and carried one that belonged to Pittman. Hall's team had a radio mix-up during a discussion about oxygen bottles. According to Mike Trueman, who coordinated the rescue from base camp, the leader of the South African team refused to lend his radio once other groups' batteries ran flat.
Take away any one of these and most of the eight probably walk down. Put them all in the same twelve hours, and the margin is gone.
Whose story is it?
If you've read one book about 1996, you've read one version of it. That's not a criticism. It's how a disaster looks when the people who lived through it were starved of oxygen, exhausted and scattered across a mountain in the dark.
Into Thin Air, Jon Krakauer's 1997 bestseller, is the one most people know. He was a journalist and a participant, which gives the book its pull. It is also sharply critical of Anatoli Boukreev, both for climbing without bottled oxygen as a guide and for descending ahead of his clients.
Boukreev and co-author G. Weston DeWalt answered the same year with The Climb. Boukreev argued that going without oxygen was safer for him, that Fischer had agreed to it, and that going down early let him prepare to help if clients got into trouble. His critics reply that a guide who can't help clients down isn't doing the job. His night of rescues is the evidence his supporters point to.
And there are more voices: Beck Weathers in Left for Dead, Lene Gammelgaard in Climbing High, Lou Kasischke in After the Wind, Graham Ratcliffe in A Day to Die For, and Mike Trueman in The Storms. Add the 1998 IMAX film, the PBS documentary Storm Over Everest and the 2015 film Everest, which took in over 200 million dollars worldwide. Each tells it a little differently.
Even the numbers have moved. In 1997, Krakauer calculated that, given the crowds, 1996 had been a statistically safer-than-average year. A 2025 analysis of the updated Himalayan Database showed it was actually an extremely deadly one, and Krakauer has said he'll correct it in future editions.
And there's one more gap. Most of what's published comes from Western clients and guides. The Sherpa team members who fixed ropes, carried loads and went out into the storm are far less documented. Lopsang Jangbu, Fischer's head Sherpa, was criticised in some accounts. He gave his own response to Outside magazine, and was killed in an avalanche that September. Boukreev died on Annapurna that December.
What Changed, and What Didn't

The short version: Everest is better organised than it was in 1996, and it is a lot busier. Most of the specific failures of that day now have a fix attached.
1996 | Today | |
|---|---|---|
Ropes | Not in place when the teams arrived | A dedicated team usually fixes the line to the summit before clients go up |
Weather | Forecasts existed but were unevenly used | Paid forecasting services and daily briefings on summit windows |
Oxygen | Planned close to the minimum | Larger caches on the route, and clients taught to change their own bottles |
Turnaround time | Stated but not enforced | The better operators write it into contracts and give guides the authority to enforce it |
Communication | Patchy radios and a limited satellite link | Satellite phones, GPS trackers, and mobile coverage at base camp |
Rescue | Walk down or wait | Helicopter evacuation is routine from the lower camps |
What hasn't changed is the number of people who want the same narrow weather window. More than 800 climbers now reach the summit in a year, and Nepal issued 421 permits in 2024 alone. Queues at the same technical bottlenecks that cost lives in 1996 still form in good weather.
The mountain's other killers also remain. The 2014 and 2015 avalanches had nothing to do with turnaround times or oxygen bottles. And much of the push for better insurance and pay for Nepali high-altitude workers came after 2014, not after 1996, which says something about whose safety the 1996 story was mostly about.
Other Dark Days on Mount Everest
1996 is the most famous tragedy on the mountain, but it isn't the deadliest. It is the most documented, and that is not the same thing.
When | What happened | Deaths |
|---|---|---|
12 April 2023 | A collapsing serac in the Khumbu Icefall | 3 Sherpa guides |
25 April 2015 | An earthquake triggers an avalanche that sweeps through Base Camp | About 22 (counts range from 18 to 23) |
18 April 2014 | A serac collapse in the Khumbu Icefall; the Nepal-side season is cancelled | 16 Nepali guides and support staff |
10-11 May 1996 | The storm on the South Col route and Northeast Ridge | 8 |
5 April 1970 | An Icefall avalanche hits Sherpas supporting a Japanese ski expedition | 6 |
June 1924 | George Mallory and Andrew Irvine vanish near the summit | 2 |
The 1924 entry is still unfinished business. Mallory's body was found in 1999, but whether he and Irvine reached the top before they died remains one of mountaineering's open questions.
Look down the list and a pattern shows up. In 1970, 2014 and 2023, the dead were Sherpas and other Nepali workers doing the jobs that make every foreign expedition possible. The 2015 earthquake behind the Base Camp avalanche killed nearly 9,000 people across Nepal.
Where You Can Stand Beside The Memorials

You don't need to climb Everest to meet this story. If you trek to Everest Base Camp, you walk straight through it.
On the way from Dingboche to Lobuche, the trail climbs for about an hour from Thukla (4,620 m) up the moraine of the Khumbu Glacier to Thukla Pass at 4,830 m.
At the top, the ridge is lined with dozens of stone chortens hung with faded prayer flags, each one for a climber or Sherpa who died on Everest or a neighbouring peak.
Among them are memorials to Scott Fischer and Rob Hall. Most trekkers go quiet here. It also puts the rest of the story in perspective.
At Kala Patthar (5,545 m), the highest point of the trek, the air holds about half the oxygen it does at sea level, and every step feels like work. The summit is another 3,300 metres above you, where the air holds only a third.
That is why our 14- and 16-day itineraries build in two acclimatisation days, and why guides check everyone's oxygen levels each day. There's more on how that works in the altitude section of the Everest Base Camp trek page.
One more detail from the trail: you can't see Everest's summit from base camp, because the shoulder of Nuptse blocks it. You see the Khumbu Icefall instead, and in spring, the tent city of the teams preparing for the climb.
Conclusion
The 1996 Everest disaster wasn't caused by one mistake. It came from weather, altitude, exhaustion, delays, and difficult decisions all interacting on the same two days, each one making the others more dangerous. The event changed how the world understood commercial Everest climbing, and it pushed the industry toward the more conservative safety practices many operators use today.
Modern technology has made Everest expeditions better prepared than they were in 1996, but the mountain remains inherently dangerous, and no amount of forecasting or equipment changes that fact entirely. If the 1996 disaster teaches one lasting lesson, it's this: reaching the summit is never more important than returning safely.
Frequently asked questions
1. How many people died in the 1996 Everest disaster?
Eight climbers died in the storm of 10 and 11 May 1996: five on the Nepal side and three on the Tibet side. Twelve people died across the whole spring season.
2. Who died in the 1996 Everest disaster?
Rob Hall, Andy Harris, Doug Hansen and Yasuko Namba of Adventure Consultants, Scott Fischer of Mountain Madness, and Indo-Tibetan Border Police officers Tsewang Samanla, Dorje Morup and Tsewang Paljor.
3. What caused the 1996 Everest disaster?
No single thing. Missing ropes and crowding pushed the schedule past the turnaround time, oxygen ran short on the descent, and a storm that may have been forecast arrived while climbers were still high.
4. Was 1996 the deadliest disaster in Everest's history?
No. The 2015 earthquake avalanche at Base Camp and the 2014 Khumbu Icefall avalanche each killed more people in a single event. The 1996 season was the deadliest on record until 2014.
5. Is the film Everest a true story?
Yes, it dramatises the real events and mostly follows Krakauer's version. Some scenes and conversations were changed for the screen.
6. Which book should I read first?
Start with Into Thin Air, then read The Climb to see the other side of the argument. If you want a third view, add Left for Dead or A Day to Die For.
7. Can you see the 1996 memorials on the Everest Base Camp trek?
Yes. Memorials for Scott Fischer and Rob Hall stand among the chortens at Thukla Pass (4,830 m), on the standard route between Dingboche and Lobuche.
8. Is Everest safer now than in 1996?
In some ways. Ropes, forecasts, communication and rescue are better organised, but crowds, avalanches and the death zone are still there.
Sources
Pages opened and checked on 30 October 2026.
1996 Mount Everest disaster, Wikipedia: the timeline, the casualty list, the oxygen plan, the weather research, and the published accounts (Krakauer 1997; Boukreev and DeWalt 1997; Ratcliffe 2011; Trueman 2015; Moore and Semple on oxygen uptake).
What was the 1996 Everest disaster?, Advnture: how commercial climbing grew, other Everest disasters, permit numbers and the film's box office.



